Israel’s Terror Inside (Trailer)
Aug 31, 2009 News & Events
Max Blumenthal and the Daily Nuisance present the trailer for their forthcoming documentary exposing rising repression inside Israel as the country moves rapidly towards authoritarianism. An activist faces jail for blocking bulldozers; the Knesset attempts to criminalize the Nakba and all opposing “Jewish and democratic” state; feminists investigated for incitement to draft dodge; Palestinian-Israelis arrested for election protest — where is Israel going? Featuring interviews with Ezra Nawi, Breaking the Silence, Sameh Jabarin, Naomi Chazan, Bi’ilin Popular Committee, New Profile and others facing extreme repression from Israel’s right-wing government.
Tags: israel, Israels terror, protest
John Hanson – An American who speaks fluent Urdu
Aug 31, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan
John Hanson is an American who works for IMF and lives in Washington DC. He is fluent in more than 15 languages, Urdu is one of them. He visited Pakistan at the age of 19 and became interested to learn Urdu.
Tags: American, John Hanson, Washington DC
The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation
Aug 31, 2009 Islam, News & Events
The contemporary religious revival is a complex business. In the same period that Muslim societies, in their weakness, seem to have re-embraced Islam, America, in its strength, has re-embraced Christianity. Western Europe remains avowedly secular. Despite the contradictions within the West, mainstream Orientalism holds that all cultures are developing towards the universal (or, more specifically, globalised) model of secular modernity and the market. The Muslim world experiences backwardness to the extent that it resists secularisation.
“The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation”, a subtle and erudite book by former Iraqi minister Ali A Allawi, challenges this thesis. Surveying the Muslims’ social, economic and moral failures, and the terror espoused by certain Islamist groups, Allawi suggests the problem might not be too much Islam, but too little.
He argues that privatised religion cannot work in Islam, a civilisational framework which rests on the tripod of private ritual, public ethics and individual spiritual striving. The three must feed into and balance each other, but the current ‘revival’ operates only in the field of religiosity, focusing on naked symbols and rules, proclaiming the superiority of Islam while adopting wholesale, and indiscriminately, the technology, economics and cultural products of the West. It emphasises the Sharia as a set of fixed punishments rather than as a framework of legislative principles. (Allawi perhaps doesn’t explain the distinction thoroughly enough). For the revivalists, the public sphere is too often reduced to the state, and their political project is simply to seize control of repressive state apparatuses.
The result is a discomforting disjunction between inner and outer worlds, symbolised by contradictory Muslim landscapes: home interiors spotlessly clean, while the streets outside are strangled by plastic bags. For Allawi the courtesy, hospitality and warmth still met with in the Muslim world are the mere remnants of Islamic civilisation, and the religious revival may be its last gasp.
So what happened? Allawi doesn’t romanticise the Islamic past, yet he rejects the Arabocentric myth of continual decline since the Mongol destruction of the Abbasid empire. A dynamism and internal coherence – and a universalism which allowed Ibn Batuta, trained in Tangiers, to find work as a judge in the Maldives – lasted until the European penetration. Then the first response to Western imperialism came on Islam’s own terms, from leaders such as Chechnya’s Imam Shamil or the Algerian Abd el-Qadir, whose legitimacy derived from their ethical Sufism as much as from their championing of law. Abd el-Qadir waged jihad against the French, and also saved thousands of Christians from the mob in his Damascene exile.
After military defeat the Sufi orders degenerated (Allawi concedes they were in many cases already mired in superstition), were co-opted by imperial powers and encouraged to ignore the problematic public realm. As a result, the tariqat became irrelevant, and the Muslims lost the heart of their tradition. Sadly, the process continues today, as illustrated by New Labour’s romance with the tame and supposedly Sufi-oriented Quilliam Foundation, whose spokesmen opine on “the racist Arab psyche” and teach, for instance, that rejecting Zionism on principle is a sign of Islamic extremism – news to the anti-Zionist Christians and Marxists of the Arab world.
Almost everywhere, Allawi maintains, Islam experienced a traumatic rupture rather than an evolution into modernity. Colonial powers and then westernised ruling classes dismantled the institutions of Islam, from seminaries to the Caliphate. The work ethic disappeared with the guilds connected to urban Sufi orders, leaving a corrupt marketplace and a culture of backstabbing. Islam’s collapse in confidence has been so severe that elites in north Africa and Pakistan no longer speak the same language as the masses. Kemalist Turkey not only substituted more ‘modern’ Roman letters for Arabic script, but even criminalised reading Osmanli Turkish (contrast this with the self-consciously modern and Western state of Israel, which re-established Hebrew script).
Allawi holds up Japan’s Meiji Restoration as a modernising response to external challenges, but on the basis of Japan’s own cultural framework, and wishes the Muslims had managed something similar. He points out that where Islam did evolve towards modernity in countries beyond Western control, the results were encouraging. During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 09, for example, Najaf-based ayatollahs promoted “the liberty of the general public from arbitrary and unaccountable government by force,” and described freedom as “a rational process and one of the pillars of the Islamic faith.”
Despite the existence of Islamic concepts allowing for democracy (shura), freedom of speech (naseeha and ra’i), and social justice (’adl), voices such as those from Najaf have been exceptions to the rule of defeat and stagnation.
In one of its most engaging sections, the book focuses on Islam’s urban crisis. The colonial separation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ cities epitomised the civilisational rupture, and post-colonial regimes have committed even greater vandalism. The Wahhabi House of Saud has demolished 95% of historical buildings in the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina for fear of idolatry, and to make way for the true idols of the time: consumer outlets and gated accomodation. Meanwhile Gulf city-states are characterised by “rampant commercialism, brand worship, gigantism, strict class segregation and a calendar of ‘festivals’ and ‘events’ designed by marketers.”
The economic news is worse still. For all the oil wealth and untrammelled capitalism, the member countries of the OIC account for 22% of global population yet generate only 6% of world GDP. An Islamic alms tax (zakat) of 2.5% on the sovereign wealth funds of Gulf countries would produce an annual $75 billion wealth transfer to the poorest Muslim states, but this isn’t on the agenda. Key Islamic values like justice, fairness and education have been ignored, and an illusory counter-movement to the collapse has been led, in the Sunni world, by Wahhabism. This puritanical reform movement is painfully literalist, unimaginative, and viciously sectarian. As anti-intellectual as it is anti-mystical, it rejects the flexibility of the traditional schools of law. Its influence has been projected far beyond the central Arabian desert by oil money and the ungodly Saudi-US alliance. The result is a schizophrenic response to the West – passivity and collaboration on the one hand, nihilistic terrorism on the other.
Unlike those (such as Hazel Blears) who assume all visions of a potential Islamic superstate can be equated with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s, Allawi suggests that “it is the absence of any formal and substantial Islamic political presence at the global level that contributes to instability and disorder.” Chinese-Confucian and Indian-Hindu civilisations have, more or less, territorial contiguity. The West is represented by two powers – the EU and the US – and by institutions from NATO to the World Bank. But since the loss of its multi-national empires, Islam is splintered between weak states lacking popular legitimacy and very often governed by client regimes. Muslim countries become adjuncts of the established civilisational blocks, Morocco to Europe, for instance, or Malaysia to China, and no serious power is capable or willing to defend suffering Muslims internationally. It is noteworthy that the only Muslim voice to have condemned China’s oppression of Uighur Muslims is al-Qa’ida.
Allawi could be criticised for skirting too close to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. His constant application of the “Judaeo-Christian” epithet to the West is slightly annoying – surely the West is Hellenistic too, and for that matter Islamic, through Spain and the scientific heritage. But he avoids the fallacy of absolutely discrete cultures, and it is refreshing to read a Muslim participating in a ‘civilisational’ discourse which has usually targetted Muslims.
The book’s insistence on the role of the divine in public life will be controversial in the West, but not in most of the Muslim world. 79% of Pakistanis, 70% of Moroccans and even 43% of Turks consider themselves to be Muslims before citizens of their respective nation states. Again, Allawi’s argument is not theological but civilisational: he calls for a culture confidently aware of its core values and able to act upon them.
“The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation” offers a comprehensive sweep of Muslim world issues, from banking to human rights and the role of Muslim migrants. It introduces some remarkable but little known Islamic thinkers such as Muhammad Asad (born Leopold Weiss), Pakistan’s first ambassador to the UN, Iranian dissident Abd el-Karim Soroush, and the Sudanese Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, who understood those sections of the Quran revealed at Mecca to be of universal spiritual relevance, but the Medinan verses to be limited to the Prophet’s specific moment. In its rich and diverse portrayal of Muslim thought, the book is a corrective to the simplistic orientalism of the Bernard Lewis school.
Allawi tries hard to find positive signs. He praises the anti-sectarian Amman Message, the work of architect Hassan Fathy, and the current resurgence in Sufism even in the Wahhabi heartland. He mourns missed opportunities such as Mahathir Muhammad’s proposed gold-based currency for intra-Islamic trade, and stresses these ideas are still there for the taking. But ultimately, the book is more a lament than a programme for renewal. Waiting for the renewal, the Muslims suffer with Libyan novelist Ahmad al-Faqih, who wrote, “A time has passed and another time is not coming.”
This was published in Prospect Magazine.
HARNESSING THE INDIAN/PAKISTAN SUB-CONTINENT
Aug 31, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan
India and Pakistan are the focus of a lot of foreign policy attention in recent years–and for good reason: Both are rival nuclear powers as well as long-time client states of competing world powers Russia and China, respectively. However, during the last three decades the US has made extensive covert inroads–first into Pakistan–and then into India. Ultimately, I believe, US globalist leaders are attempting to take advantage of this second most populous area of the globe to create a future counter force to China’s growing hegemony. However, in the interim period Pakistan and India have been used to foment both state-sponsored terrorism and nuclear proliferation on behalf of CIA black operations. Bits and pieces of this story have began to emerge from the statements of retired Lieutenant General Hamid Gul who was the head of Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence Agency from 1987 to 1989, the last two years of the CIA-managed, secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
General Gul obviously knows a lot about the CIA’s relationship with Osama bin Laden and other “former” US allies in the proxy war against the Soviets–perhaps too much. Whereas the US tells the story that Osama bin Laden turned against the US, Gul believes the covert mission of the CIA for bin Laden changed, creating a top secret group of private terrorists called al Qaeda that would be used to act as a catalyst for intervention and change in the New World Order.
Gul, for example, does not believe that al Qaeda pulled off the 9/11 attacks independent of the US, but that it was an “inside job.” Gul told Alex Jones in a December 2008 interview that “9/11 took place on the American soil, [and] not a single person has been caught inside America, even though for doing such a job I think [it would] require a huge amount of logistic support in the area where such operation is carried out.” He’s absolutely correct. The hijacked airliners alone were incapable of bringing down the two main WTC towers, let alone building 7 which symmetrically imploded even though never directly hit or structurally damaged by debris.
Just to plant the amount of explosives in the various WTC buildings needed to bring them down at near free fall speed would require at least 50 explosives experts trained in high rise demolition work. Such work had to be planned and implemented with highly sophisticated electronic timers and the use of special thermite burning explosives to deal with the massive size of the vertical main steel columns–technology exclusive to the West. The WTC buildings were completely shut down for “maintenance” the weekend prior to the attack, something that had never been done before, and which was ordered by the building security people themselves–not Middle Eastern terrorists. I think that’s when the final explosives were planted. No small group of Middle Eastern terrorists could have gained that kind of official access to the highly secured buildings.
Because Gul believes 9/11 was an inside job, he has become the target of a major disinformation and smear campaign by the US. US officials have even induced India to accuse him of helping plan the Mumbai attacks. India is demanding his extradition on those charges. Pakistan says “show us the evidence” and we will try him in open court–but so far, no evidence.
It appears Gul knows enough secrets involving high ranking US and Pakistani officials to ensure his safety from extradition from Pakistan, but certainly not enough to keep the US from trying to paint him as a supporter of the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. That is why he is speaking out more openly now, not only to defend himself but to tell the truth before he gets killed.
Here are comments and excerpts from his various interviews. First, from the Foreign Policy Journal, Jeremy R. Hammond reports: “He has been called ‘the most dangerous man in Pakistan.’ and the U.S. government has accused him of supporting the Taliban, even recommending him to the United Nations Security Council for inclusion on the list of international terrorists. In an exclusive interview with Foreign Policy Journal, I asked the former ISI chief what his response was to these allegations.
“He replied, ‘Well, it’s laughable I would say, because I’ve worked with the CIA and I know they were never so bad as they are now’ [Gul correctly views his work with the CIA to destabilize the Russian occupation of Afghanistan as legitimate, but not the CIA's subsequent use of terror to attack targets in the West]. He said this was ‘a pity for the American people’ since the CIA is supposed to act ‘as the eyes and ears’ of the country. As for the charge of him supporting the Taliban, ‘it is utterly baseless. I have no contact with the Taliban, nor with Osama bin Laden and his colleagues.’ He added, ‘I have no means, I have no way that I could support them, that I could help them.’
“After the Clinton administration’s failed attempt to assassinate Osama bin Laden in 1998, some U.S. officials alleged that bin Laden had been tipped off by someone in Pakistan to the fact that the U.S. was able to track his movements through his satellite phone. Counter-terrorism advisor to the National Security Council Richard Clarke said, ‘I have reason to believe that a retired head of the ISI [Gul] was able to pass information along to Al Qaeda that the attack was coming.’ When I put this charge to him, General Gul pointed out to me that he had retired from the ISI on June 1, 1989, and from the army in January, 1992 [and that this info from the CIA about the hunt for bin Laden could only have come to Gul through the ISI -which was still controlled by the CIA]. ‘Did you [the US] share this information with the ISI?’ he asked. ‘And why haven’t you [the US] taken the ISI to task for parting this information to its ex-head?’ [devastating argument, to which the US or ISI has no response]. The U.S. had not informed the Pakistan army chief, Jehangir Karamat, of its intentions, he said, so how could he have learned of the plan to be able to warn bin Laden?”
In fact, bin Laden, still working for the CIA to help organize the actual hijackers (none of which were the named hijackers), was tipped off, and the CIA picked Gul to take the rap as the fall guy, to divert attention away from the ISI and others.
“General Gul turned our conversation to the subject of 9/11 and the war on Afghanistan. ‘You know, my position is very clear,’ he said. ‘It’s a moral position that I have taken. And I say that America has launched this aggression without sufficient reasons [at least, not the stated reason]. They haven’t even proved the case that 9/11 was done by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.’ He argued that ‘There are many unanswered questions about 9/11,’ citing examples such as the failure to intercept any of the four planes after it had become clear that they had been hijacked. He questioned how Mohammed Atta [or Hani Hanjour], ‘who had had training on a light aircraft in Miami for six months’ could have maneuvered a jumbo jet ’so accurately’ to hit his target. He made reference to the flight that hit the Pentagon and the maneuver its pilot had performed, dropping thousands of feet while doing a near 360 degree turn before plowing into its target.
“‘And then, above all,’ he added, ‘why have no heads been rolled? The FBI, the CIA, the air traffic control —- why have they not been put to question, put to task?’ Describing the 9/11 Commission as a ‘cover up’, the general added, ‘I think the American people have been made fools of.’
“At this point in our discussion, General Gul explained how both the U.S. and United Kingdom stopped granting him an entry visa [which he views as contradictory to their attempts to get him extradited to India]. ‘If I’m a security risk [and charged with terrorism], then it is paradoxical that you should exclude me from your jurisdiction. You should rather nab me, interrogate me, haul me up, take me to the court, whatever you like [Good point. They want him tried in India where others can deal with rigging the evidence].
Tags: cia, Isreal, Mumbai Attacks, Pakistan, SUB-CONTINENT, USA, world affairs
Don’t Tell My Mother That I am in Pakistan: Karachi Uncovered
Aug 29, 2009 Pakistan
While living in Karachi, Pakistan we don’t even know if there is any bar or night club in our city where bear and wine are easily available but Diego from National Geographic uncovers Karachi. isn’t it AMAZING!?!?! Worth Watch
Tags: karachi, karachi night bar, Karachi uncovered, night bar karachi, Night Club in Pakistan, Pakistan
India’s 1998 Nuclear Test Was A Failure
Aug 29, 2009 News & Events
Indian scientists admit that Pokran 2 was failure. Indian atom bomb test was failure and their chief scientist admit that it was of much lower category as compare to Pakistan test. On the other hand Pakistan conducted 6 very successful test give 100% precise results. Note: India already conducted nuclear test in 70s.
Tags: India, india mssile, india nuclear tests, India’s 1998
71 percent Pakistani want Musharraf to pay for crimes Gallup survey
Aug 29, 2009 News & Events, pakistan politics
About 52 per cent favour harsh while 19 per cent support mild punishment to the former president, and 15 per cent favour no punishment and the remaining 14 per cent did not give a view,” says the survey launched by Gilani Research Foundation.
A nationally representative sample of men and women from across the country were asked “recently the Supreme Court has termed the enforcement of emergency on November 3, 2007 illegal”.
Some people believed Musharraf should be punished for this, while some believe he should not. When asked the punishment should be harsh, mild, or none, Majority, 52 per cent, said he (Musharraf) should be punished harshly and 19 per cent believed he should be given a mild punishment for this crime.
Fifteen per cent of the respondents did not support punishing Musharraf for enforcing emergency on November 3, 2007 while 14 per cent did not give any response. The survey findings also showed that while there are no significant differences in views on punishing Gen (retd) Musharraf across gender and age, there are notable differences across political affiliations.Those intending to vote for the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, the MMA, the JUI and the ANP have higher support for punishing Musharraf, above 80 per cent, followed by the PPP voters and the PML-Q voters (around 60 per cent) and the support is the lowest amongst the MQM voters at only 19 per cent.
Tags: Gallup survey, Musharraf
Senior Minister Sindh Pir Mazhar
Aug 28, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan, pakistan politics
People in Dadu are trying to reach near truck to get one floor bag Not in Free they are paying it But check how Police is treating them worth watch!.
Tags: Dadu, Pakistan, Pir Mazhar, Sindh, Sindh Government
