Lara Carft (Angelina Julie) on a diffrent mission
Nov 20, 2009 Articles, entertainment
Tags: Angelina Julie, Lara Carft
How do you solve a problem like Meera?
Nov 19, 2009 Articles, entertainment
Shahrezad Samiuddin
How do you, indeed? Meera does the rounds via SMS jokes about her English. Meera helps a damp squib sink to the bottom of the Indian box office. Meera’s alleged husband turns up demanding his house and crores back. Meera predicts she’ll be linked to Musharraf and Clinton next (you wish, M). Meera is the opposite of Humayun Saeed, says Mahesh Bhatt with tongue in cheek. And most recently, Meera interviews photographer Tapu Javeri in her very own talk show.
If, after seeing that clip, you cringed and wrote ‘Not funny,’ or ‘Not her language’ under the link on Facebook, this blog is for you. And if you hooted and laughed, read ahead anyway.
When was the last time you heard about the woman actually doing what she originally became famous for? Remember Meera the actress? No? That’s because last time you saw her she was a wannabe talk show host. As the maybe-been-to-school Meera tried to interview Javeri (of all people) in English (of all languages) one really began to wonder whether she was dropped on her head as a baby.
And before you say she was set up, let’s pause for a moment and accept that some producer hatched the plan with a few friends, laughed about it with his colleagues, and then gave Meera a call in the morning. How cruel. But only if she had been kidnapped, dragged by the hair to the studio, and shown a gun. My point is, Meera did the show willingly, in that slinky black dress with immaculate makeup and a camera in the room. She spent hours there knowing, better than us, that she didn’t know the language. You and I wouldn’t plunge ourselves headlong into a made-for-Filipino-audiences talk show in Tagalog. At least not before some solid language lessons.
The fact is, despite her shenanigans, Meera remains important. Her importance is the same as the importance of the village idiot in a, well, village. She completes the landscape. And for everyone going out on a limb to defend her by citing her ‘lacks’ (of education, background, upbringing) the moment has arrived, post-talk show clip, to just drop it. Stop feeling some elitist guilt about her ‘lacks.’ Delete that ‘Not funny’ that you wrote on Facebook, hold your stomach, throw your head back, and truly laugh for a change. There are very, very few moments that make us laugh in this country, so cherish one when it is provided.
Despite the illiteracy and tastelessness that rules the roost in what’s left of Lollywood, few of its divas make such obvious public blunders with such ridiculous regularity. Time was when Reema would roll out memorised English at award shows to sniggers from all the angrezi-medium types. But Reems has been earning our admiration (because English earns that sort of thing here) as she speaks the language nearly flawlessly, if a little formally, today. The woman has used her time and money wisely to get what she wants.
Saima, another Lollywood mainstay, once admitted in a TV interview that she had never been to school. But really, do you care when you see her light up the silver screen when you watch a Pakistani flick for a laugh and find out that you really can’t laugh at her skills? And Resham who is just too busy wowing us with her metamorphoses in TV play after TV play, and who just doesn’t have the time to worry about English or her lack of it. And their scandals? If ever they leak out, these actresses handle them in a manner that is usually informed by the knowledge that they are public figures. These same actresses, with all their ‘lacks,’ handle it better than Paris Hilton, who incidentally had access to the best education, a privileged background in the most privileged country in the world, and an upbringing by educated, if not sensible, parents as well as a host of educated nannies.
It is not Meera’s circumstances, as the Meera-bachao brigade have put forward, but a politically incorrect ‘lack of intelligence.’ And hence, everything.
This is not a rant against Meera. It is about accepting that she, like Hilton, is missing a couple of million grey cells. More importantly, this is about accepting that when her next big scandal explodes, We, the people, will watch it again in all its trashy glory. It’s also about accepting that a lot of people will laugh. She’s a celebrity for goodness sake. And celebrities who put themselves out there do so knowing that people can and do laugh. Even Meera, as she stumbles over all English in the YouTube clip, has the foresight to remark that ‘mera record lagay ga.’
Hilton, Raakhi Sawant, and Malika Sherawat. Since the world turned into a global village, around the world, pop culture’s been cultivating celebrities to fulfill the role traditionally played by the courtjester.
For all her ‘lacks,’ Meera is an adult who has had the exposure reserved for the top one percent of this country. She scores extra points on exposure, because she has actually risen from nothing. It’s not her deprivations which have made her stupid. It’s her wickedly brilliant luck and drive that have made her famous. And still the learning curve flatlines. Does she love the attention? Doesn’t Paris Hilton?
So please don’t cry for ‘poor little Meera.’ She’s not a babe in the wild, wild woods. She’s certainly not the proverbial deer in the headlights (even though she looks as pretty as one sometimes). She’s not a bechari. To think that makes us patronising and sorely lacking in humour.
She is, on the other hand, our Paris Hilton. Our Malika Sherawat. Our very own village idiot. Which brings us back to the original question, how do you solve a problem like Meera? And the answer to that is a firm: ‘You don’t.’
Tags: Film star meera, Meera, Meera english Guru, Meera scandals
Americans see a change in the air in Pakistan
Sep 28, 2009 Articles, News & Events, Pakistan, pakistan politics
Thursday, September 24, 2009
By Dr Shahid Masood
WASHINGTON: Americans see a change fast, but smoothly, coming in Pakistan in the wake of loss of credibility of the man at the helm, following some domestic legal developments.
After meeting top political and defence decision-makers here in the US capital, where I was invited by the National Defence University (NDU) for a two-day seminar on the anniversary of 9/11, I was told in unambiguous terms that a change in Pakistan was inevitable for US policy interests, although Washington does not intend to disrupt the system.
Several important Pakistani political players have also been conveyed the same message by the US political and defence establishment, including the MQM and recently the ANP, whose chief is travelling with President Asif Zardari in New York.
The main problem being faced by the US administration, which it may never admit publicly, is that the present set-up with Asif Ali Zardari as the de facto ruler, has no credibility at home and no ability to deliver on the promises he makes, either on the military side or on the war on terror or on governance issues.
“Zardari has also abandoned the idea of political consensus which he had started to follow in the early days after the February elections,” one official said on background. “He appears to be non-serious in government and lives in perpetual fear and insecurity, preferring to stay out of the country.”
The US side thinks that they had made a sensible move by pushing an alliance between late Benazir Bhutto and General Pervez Musharraf as this team would have provided all the ingredients of a stable and cooperative Pakistan to Washington. She would have provided the political support while Musharraf would have used his military muscle against the terrorists and extremists in a stable environment.
They say Zardari has failed to provide that environment, rather he has involved himself in day-to-day business and administrative matters while his political coalition and parliament have been left looking like dumb and dummies.
Many officials say Zardari has been asking the US administration to bail him out on too many issues and too many occasions. He has sought the US help to tame the Army, keep his alliance partners, especially the opposition of Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N in check, directly or through the Saudis on sensitive issues like Musharraf’s or cutting his own constitutional powers.
All these demands are way beyond the capacity of any US administration to deliver while Zardari has almost left everything to us to handle, an agitated official said. “If we have to handle everything, his own credibility within the country will sink and has sunk to the lowest low.”
Other officials I met were even blunter. They say the US abhors corruption, kickbacks and commissions anywhere in the world as a matter of policy.
Another official said the US would keep track of the parties or persons involved and money transaction in the Pakistan’s rental power venture. There are still no roadmaps or any modality work sheets in Washington on how a change in Pakistan would occur, but the US capital is keeping its fingers crossed as to what comes out of the NRO case pending with the Supreme Court.
The impression gathered from the words of these top Americans is that the US would not intervene if the apex court starts hearing the case. The view is that if the NRO was discussed and details of who benefited, who made what deals and how serious crimes were committed and then whitewashed, start to be revealed in the SC, the moral authority of the NRO beneficiaries would erode fatally. In this scenario, the NRO beneficiaries may themselves throw in the towel seeking a safe exit.
In several informed US and Pakistani circles I moved in for several days in Washington, the same scenario was repeated, often exactly in the same tone and sequence.
A Pakistani, who knows a lot about developments in Pakistan and the US scene, said that apart from this purely legal and domestic scene, there were four possible ways through which Zardari could exit. These ways were repeated by others who had nothing to do at all with the previous source. They are: one, impeachment; two, voluntary resignation in the wake loss of credibility; three, ‘natural’ or man-made elimination of the president, and, four, an Army coup. The impeachment and coup scenarios are considered non-starter and impossibility.
US and some Pakistani circles said that a resignation after enough dirt is thrown in the public domain when the NRO case details begin to unfold is a favourite way out, as it would not, being an outcome of the legal process, disrupt the system.
I was asked many times whether a coup is a possibility in the current situation and I always said no, but the question kept surfacing again and again.
This is probably because there was some loose talk of a shuffle in the military hierarchy by President Zardari in which Army chief General Kayani was to be replaced by some other pliant general who could ensure continuity and stability for the Zardari regime.
This scenario was shot down in Washington instantly as an impossibility, since it had information that the Pakistan Army considered a coup or intervention as a total no-go area and could have brought back another October 12, 1999 type of situation. It is so also because of the fact that Gen Kayani has established, through words and deeds, that he is all for democracy.
With all these scenarios being discussed, the growing feeling is that not much time is left for the current status quo and it will lead to a period of political turmoil in Pakistan if President Zardari continues with his ways any longer.
The sudden emergence of a top MQM delegation in Washington for talks with the policy makers, officials and think tanks of Washington has also raised many questions as the official Pakistani diplomatic channels were totally cut off and I gather that this was done at the insistence of the US side more than the MQM leadership.
Not even a courtesy meeting between Governor Ishratul Ebad and Ambassador Husain Haqqani was held until four days after the arrival of the MQM delegation and meetings with top strategists, including Bruce Riedel, John Negroponte, Richard Boucher, and current State Department officials, including Richard Holbrooke.
A similar exercise has now been planned with the ANP chief while he will be here in the presidential entourage.
What happened in these meetings is known only to the MQM leaders and the US side but the tone and tenor of MQM in the coming weeks and days will give the first hints of whether the course of the PPP-MQM alliance is changing in stormy waters in the middle of the sea. How the ANP reacts is also to be seen but already Asfandyar Wali is said to be very happy with the praise for his party’s governance in the NWFP by US officials as well as the promises to give them direct financial aid. With the MQM and the ANP almost on board, I will be eagerly waiting for the first signs of the new US strategy unfolding in the days and weeks to come.
Tags: ANP, Asif Zardari, Dr Shahid Masood, Gen Kayani, MQM
Beyond ‘Af-Pak’
Jun 7, 2009 Articles, war on terror
Foreign Policy
The United States cannot win in Afghanistan while ignoring Central Asia.
On May 26, unknown assailants attacked a border post in Uzbekistan’s volatile Fergana Valley. Less than 24 hours later, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the nearby city of Andijan, killing a policeman. Both attacks were claimed by a shadowy group of Islamist militants with ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Although post-Soviet Central Asia has seen little terrorism in recent years, the attacks are a reminder that the conflicts underway in Afghanistan and Pakistan have a regional dimension — and that the stepped-up U.S. involvement in the region carries the risk that instability will spread to other countries. While the fight against Islamist extremism may already seem dauntingly wide-ranging and complex, the Obama administration’s thinking is not complicated enough. It’s time to stop ignoring the Central Asian dimension of this conflict.
The U.S. presence in the region has already begun to expand. In the face of mounting instability in Pakistan, the U.S. military has increasingly turned to post-Soviet Central Asia as an alternative route for shipping supplies to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan is currently Washington’s major transit point, but, under pressure from Moscow, the Kyrgyz government has ordered U.S. troops to abandon their air base at Manas by August. The Kyrgyz might still experience a change of heart, but the United States has recently reached out to Uzbekistan as a possible alternative.
The most religiously conservative region of Central Asia, the Fergana Valley (a region that, thanks to Stalinist gerrymandering, encompasses parts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as Uzbekistan) has long been a center of opposition to the repressive regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Although most opposition is peaceful, the valley has nurtured militants in the past, notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which conducted a series of large-scale attacks against the government in the late 1990s. In the ensuing crackdown, IMU sympathizers fled to neighboring states. Several went to Tajikistan, where they were protected by the Tajik authorities and Russian security personnel as a means of exerting leverage against Karimov.
Others ended up in Afghanistan, where they forged close ties with both the Taliban and al Qaeda before their ranks were decimated by U.S. bombing during the invasion of Afghanistan. The survivors fled once again, many to Pakistan’s volatile tribal regions, where they were sheltered by the Pakistani Taliban. These Uzbek refugees have played a central role in the recent unrest engulfing Swat and neighboring regions of Pakistan. Now there is evidence that Islamabad’s offensive is forcing the Uzbeks back into Central Asia. Analysts in the region fear that the recent attacks in the Fergana Valley are the work of fighters fleeing Pakistan.
The militants’ displacement from Pakistan would be a boon to Islamabad’s effort to assert its sovereignty over the entirety of its territory. At the same time, it risks opening a dangerous new phase in the war, especially as Central Asian governments distrust one another and are ill-prepared to deal with an influx of battle-hardened Islamist militants. For the United States, the decision to increase troop levels in Afghanistan makes the Central Asian supply route increasingly vital and increases the risk that the war effort could be hamstrung by the spread of instability.
U.S. President Barack Obama is right that the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be won without addressing the problems of Pakistan. However, his “Af-Pak” strategy is incomplete. It requires a fuller appreciation of how the conflict’s tentacles reach into post-Soviet Central Asia and a strategy for checking the spread of Taliban-style militancy to Uzbekistan and its neighbors.
Washington is shipping some supplies through Russia, but cannot risk complete dependence on Moscow for transit to Afghanistan. For now, the administration has little choice but to rely on Central Asia, but it must do more to help the region address its own problems with extremism. Rather than just forging military alliances, Washington needs to engage more deeply to address the social problems that feed militancy, especially in the Fergana Valley. Unemployment and lack of opportunity are the biggest sources of frustration.
In addition to military facilities, the United States should provide money for schools and job training. To the extent possible, it should also cooperate with regional governments to improve the investment climate and encourage foreign companies to move into the region. It should also work with the governments of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to resolve their border disputes in the Fergana Valley and address the mistrust that prevents them from adopting a united front against the militants.
The Uzbek militants’ apparent flight from Pakistan represents progress in one phase of the struggle against extremism. To succeed in the next phase, the United States needs a regional strategy that recognizes how Central Asia is inextricably linked to the problems of “Af-Pak.”
Tags: Af Pak, afghanistan, Pakistan, taliban, US, war on terror
Karachi- A permanent Swat
Jun 7, 2009 Articles, Pakistan, pakistan politics
Muddasir Iftikhar
Jalaybi.com
Since years Karachi has been a cons piques target of terrorism of all sorts with a few long and short lapses the city continues to endure the pangs of killing and other crimes for which Karachi was referred to Beirut of Pakistan but now one likes to trace the resemblance between Karachi and swat only a month ago there was a new phase of disturbance where there were target killings of individuals of different identity in different parts of the city. But the killing was alarming within two or three days then there was a sort abetment. But as a matter of fact there is target killing as a matter of routine. There are firing incidents between different groups resulting deaths of innocent people in most of the cases and target hitting periodically. When the disturbance increases then there is often a call of strike that generally starts from late evening till the whole next day where the city generally closes for communication and other business of daily life the people of the city are consciously vocal against the law and order situation and there is a constant note of protest from the common citizens against so called groups. Identifying with certain lingual and geographical Differences but even if there are measures against incidents of violence there has never been a permanent and long lasting solution of the problem.
Looking at the constant disturbance of Karachi one naturally recalls the happenings in Swat where there has been most disturbing and frustrating situation during the last many many months resulting in a dreadful evacuation of millions of citizens becomingDPs in their own country and generally in their province. A peaceful citizen of Pakistan never wishes any part of the country to bleed like Swat and in the same way no Pakistani ever desires to see Karachi gradually leading towards a more frustrating conditions. Swat is absolutely beautiful and the people of swat are equally loveable Pakistanis while Karachi is also most beautiful because it is the hub of not only trade but also the spirit of Pakistan. Therefore the people of Karachi are also very loveable. Thus nobody can ever desire to see further destruction of Karachi.
Tags: karachi, Roits in Karachi, target killing
The frozen solution
Jun 6, 2009 Articles, Pakistan
According to a March, 2009 report on DawnNews, a majority of people in the troubled Bajaur area wanted the implementation of the shariah law.
The same report then suggested that more than 70 per cent of the people residing in Bajaur are illiterate.
Now the question is how is one to respond to a demand made by an illiterate majority?
Of course, one cannot ignore the fact that the draconian laws prevailing in the tribal areas have continued to frustrate the inhabitants, but the shariah alternative is a somewhat simplistic and rhetorical answer.
The issue is encapsulated in a simple (but pertinent) question that is asked by those advising caution in this matter: ‘What shariah?’
There is not one form or version of the Islamic body of laws. The four major schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanabali – have their own variations of the shariah, especially on issues that are not clearly ordained by the Quran. [1]
When the Islamic empire started to expand, the Arabs came into contact with various other cultures and religions. They faced a whole new set of issues on which the Quran is silent. So, beginning in early 9th Century, ulema and caliphs started devising a body of laws derived not only from the Quran but the hadith as well.
Eventually the hadith became one of the primary sources of the shariah. But there was a reaction by some Muslim scholars who claimed that that the hadith are not entirely unquestionable because they were being reported by men who were not alive during the time of Prophet Muhammad. [2]
In an attempt to answer hadith critics like the Mu’tazili philosophers who emphasized the usage of reason and logic in matters of Quranic law and interpretation, leading ‘hadith scientists’ like Imam Bukhari (d.870) and Muslim Ibn Al-Hajjaj (d.875), started devising a mathematical way to decipher the correct hadiths from the false ones. Nevertheless, the Bukhari method (considered to be the most reliable by a majority of Muslims), managed to clear a mere 2, 062 as correct hadiths out of a mammoth 300,000 or so hadiths that were in circulation. [3];[4]
Thus, a number of modern Islamic scholars, especially in the 20th century, advised a cautious approach in using the hadith in the formation of Islamic Law. Some have described the practice as an off-shoot of how the hadith were used by the Abassid caliphs (750-1258), to ‘bolster their genealogical credentials’, and to ‘Islamize’ their rulings. [5]
The shariah remained a hotly debated topic between scholars and ulema until the reign of the tenth Abassid caliph, Al-Mutawakkil (847), when the orthodox ulema began to gain an upper hand.
Scholars believe that this victory of the orthodox ulema against the rationalists was due to the fact that Muslim history was at the peak of its expansionist phase, and conservative fiqh incorporated the logic of Muslim imperialism in its discourse. However, the orthodox victory put an intellectual freeze on matters like ijtihad (independent interpretation of the legal sources), and by the 11th century the shariah laws had stopped evolving. [6]
Beginning in the 19th Century, the overriding arrangement – in which the Muslim caliphate remained tentatively secular and the shariah operated more as a theory – started to be questioned by a number of ‘reformist’ movements in the Muslim world.
The dominant reason behind the springing up of these movements was the gradual disintegration of Islamic empires in the face of the rise of Western powers.
Movements that put the non-implementation of the shariah in Muslim societies as the reason behind the empire’s downfall, eventually evolved into the varied expressions of the political Islam and militancy of the 20th Century. [7]
However, whereas violent 20th Century groups like the Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the present-day Taliban/Al-Qaeda belong to the ultra-conservative Hanabali school of jurisprudence, most non-militant radical groups who use evangelism to propagate the enforcement of the shariah usually belong to the Hanafi and Maliki fiqh.
Thus, outside the confines of what is considered to be ‘timeless and unchangeable’ in Islam, no two Islamic schools of jurisprudence agree on a single blueprint of the shariah, especially regarding the shariah’s rulings on modern-day issues, or on issues on which the Quran is silent.
One cannot convincingly produce a clear example of a singular version of shariah in history. Offering the example in this context of the system being practiced during the time of the ‘Khalifa-Rashideen’ is also largely a rhetorical gesture because the institution of the documented hadith – of which much of the shariah is made of – did not fully appear at least 200 years after the demise of the Prophet.
Today, the demand for the implementation of shariah laws is mostly based on a concocted memory of a ‘golden of age of shariah’.
A concoction that ever since the Abbasids has largely been used to gain and maintain political influence and power.
It is a rhetorical (as opposed to practical) solution because the shariah of any fiqh stopped evolving from the 11th Century onwards. Therefore, its modern-day implementation will only create tense dichotomies between assorted Muslim sects and encourage ‘religiously-ordained’ violence and crimes– especially in a pluralistic society like Pakistan.
The shariah is a man-made construct that came into being almost two centuries after the emergence of Islam; this is a fact that usually gets lost on most everyday Muslims to whom the shariah is erroneously propagated (by Political Islamists and fundamentalists) as being a wholly divine law.
In fact, till less than a hundred years ago, most Muslim leaders and scholars were largely in favour of completely reforming the shariah in an attempt to compete and exist affectively in a fast changing and modernizing world. [8]
According to a number of Islamic scholars across the centuries, the only thing entirely divine in Islam is the Quran; and on issues that are not addressed in the Quran, the ulema are required to reach a consensus through intellectual and legalistic deliberations, keeping well in mind the religious, traditional and psychodynamic culture of the place and society where an Islamic Law has to be enacted.
Harking back to a largely mythical tradition of hundreds of years ago to interpret and devise shariah in a modern setting is an act that can only spell socio-political and cultural disaster – plus, according to the scholars, this intransigent practice and propagation actually goes against the intellectual and evolutionary spirit of law-devising in Islam.
What Muslim World?
Jun 4, 2009 Articles
By Scott Carpenter, Soner Cagaptay
There’s one big problem with addressing the Muslim world: it doesn’t exist.
ven before U.S. President Barack Obama utters a word of his long-anticipated June 4 address to “the Muslim world,” there is already a problem with the rhetoric. As well meaning as it sounds, the term “Muslim world” is a trap. There is no unified Muslim world. And describing it as such legitimizes the idea that it is “us vs. them” — just the sort of divided world that al Qaeda wants to create.
To see the trouble with the term “Muslim world,” one needs only to try and define it. Who is included in the Muslim world? What countries — or individuals — make the cut, and who defines it? Is half-Muslim Nigeria a part of the Muslim world as much as the Islamic Republic of Iran? And how do different sects in internal conflict, like the Sunni and Shia of Iraq, reconcile their placement in a single “world” to American eyes? Are extremists — such as the Taliban or al Qaeda — lumped together with secular Muslims?
No one questions that a religion known as Islam exists or that many Muslims believe in their global community, the ummah. As a theological reference, however, the ummah is vaguely analogous to the belief that all Christians are part of the body of Christ. It is a powerful spiritual metaphor, but not a visceral part of every believer’s identity. A Muslim in Turkey, for example, might define himself as an Istanbullu first, a Turk second, and a Muslim third — or the other way around, depending on his mood or even the time of day. (When the soccer club Galatasaray is playing, he is only a fan!) No one would claim that Guatemalans, Germans, or Guineans are the same because they are Christians, and it’s equally nonsensical to lump Turks, Trinidadians, and Tunisians together simply because they also happen to be Muslim.
This term is not only an analytical error – it’s also a critical public diplomacy mistake. “Muslim world” unfairly and singularly assigns adherents of Islam into a figurative ghetto. And particularly in the post-September 11, this relegation carries a real moral hazard: By lumping together extremists, secularists, and everyone in between, the term “Muslim world” legitimizes the idea that all of the group’s members are locked in deadly conflict with the non-Islamic world. If this sounds dangerously close to the message through which Islamist ideologues push for jihad, it is. Extremists are the only Muslim group that strongly advocates tying all Muslims together politically, in a united global community. In their ideal world, the modern nation state would be replaced with a new caliphate under Sharia law. Every time the United States speaks to the “Muslim world,” then, it inadvertently legitimizes the extremists’ vision.
Thankfully, President Obama has a chance to get it right. He got off to a good start on May 4 in Ankara, where he admirably addressed the Turkish people as democrats embedded in Europe. He appealed to them as allies in the struggle against Islamist extremism while challenging them on sensitive issues, including reconciling with neighboring Armenia. At the tail end of the speech, however, he made that critical rhetorical slip: “Let me repeat: The United States is not at war with the Muslim world.”
This time, as he speaks on June 4, the “Islamic world” should not make a rhetorical appearance. Instead, Obama could accentuate the rich diversity of Muslim communities around the world, referencing the Sufis of Morocco, the Shiites of Iraq, and the Sunnis of Singapore. He should recognize their accomplishments within their communities while stressing other parts of their identities, such as nationality.
As he did in Turkey, Obama should offer his broad audience a challenge. There are deep problems within Muslim communities around the world. Islamist extremists continue to push their agenda of violence and chaos. Obama should off encouragement to the British, Egyptian, Algerian, and Iraqi Muslims (among others) who are already fighting back, taking on those extremists and reclaiming their communities. And he should recognize that the Muslim world is a figment of Osama bin Laden’s imagination.
Pakistan: Perceptions vs. reality
Jun 2, 2009 Articles, Pakistan
Have you ever tried searching Google for images of Pakistan? You’ll be hard-pressed to find any pictures that depict the progressive and modern aspects of our country. Try typing ‘Pakistan progress’, ‘Pakistan modern’ or ‘Pakistan cafes’ in the search bar, and chances are there will be no results. But if you just type in the word Pakistan, you’ll be flooded by a collection of frightening pictures (excluding some seductive shots of ‘Miss Pakistan’): kids holding guns, bomb blasts and violence will inundate your computer screen.
When will the world see Pakistan from all angles – the good, the bad and everything else in between?
Two recent encounters suggest that the only way we can get people to expand their vision of Pakistan is by experiencing it first hand…
I’m at Rumours, the underground club of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. The walls are quilted, the lights are dim and the music is getting louder as some foreign journalists try to unwind.
I’m talking to a British journalist I’ve never met before who explains that he’s permanently stationed in Afghanistan.
‘How do you like being in Islamabad, then?’ I ask him.
He has a thoughtful expression on his face and is suddenly overcome by the urge to reveal a thought: ‘You know… Pakistan really isn’t marketed properly. This place is really nice. It’s clean, you’ve got café’s and places to relax, you can walk on the streets with ease,’ he points out. ‘But people out there don’t know that,’ he adds, metaphorically pointing behind him.
‘Yes, that’s true. People think Pakistan is full of bearded men who run around brandishing swords,’ I respond a little emotionally.
‘Yeah,’ he muses. ‘I’d like to be back – the people are so damn nice here.’
Another time, another place:
I’m sitting in an empty restaurant interviewing Ethan Casey, author of ‘Alive and Well in Pakistan: A Human Journey in a Dangerous Time’. It’s almost like a two-way interview since he’s recording our interview and is prone to digressing. Casey has traveled to both India and Pakistan several times and compares the two as follows:
Coming across the border was a kind of of relief: India’s a pretty intense place. [When I arrived here] it was in the back of my mind that people in India were saying be careful [in Pakistan]. And yes, I would say I do think twice before I walk on the streets. But people [here] have been helpful.
When we crossed the Wagah border, I was waiting for one of my old students to come collect me, but I couldn’t see him there. These couple of guys inside a [nearby] shop said, ‘What do you need?’ Then, this old timer with a turban said, ‘Oh, you use my phone.’
This is a difference between India and Pakistan. My first reaction was to say, ‘how much does this cost?’ But he asked, ‘what number do you want to call?’ And I asked again, ‘how much does it cost?’ Then he [got] really annoyed and repeated, ‘what number do you want to call?’ He was so insulted when I asked about money! Afterwards, I asked if I could give him anything. ‘No, no, no, you are our guest,’ he said. I’ve experienced so much of that in Pakistan for 15 years – and that’s a big reason why I keep coming back.’
Source Dawn
Tags: Pakistan
Army recovers 79 kidnapped students from militants
Jun 2, 2009 Articles
02 Jun, 2009
Dawn
ISLAMABAD: All except one of the kidnapped students and staff members of Cadet College Razmak were recovered in a military operation, the Inter Services Public Relations said on Tuesday.
A statement released by the ISPR said that 79 kidnap victims, including cadets and staff members were recovered after a military operation.
‘All the cadets except one have been recovered in an army operation this morning at 5 a.m.,’ said military spokesman Major-General Athar Abbas.
The operation was carried out in Guryum area, nearly 20 kilometres east of Razmak, where the college is located.
According to Maj. Gen. Abbas, Razmak lies on the route to South Waziristan, where militant still have a stronghold, where the militants were planning to take the kidnapped students. Abbas added that the military anticipated this plan of action and launched an operation on the route leading to South Waziristan.
The resulting firefight helped army overcome the militants and recover the students, he told DawnNews.
Abbas said that the military is not carrying out an offensive operation in South Waziristan and is only preparing for any attacks from the militants in the area, where military convoys have come under attacks.
Earlier on Monday, conflicting reports came in about the number of kidnap victims with most news agencies reporting the figure to be 500.
Militants kidnapped the students of Razmak Cadet College from the Bakkakhel Frontier Region, Bannu, adjacent to the North Waziristan tribal region.
Details were sketchy but the official said that 33 vehicles had started off from Razmak, with 540 cadets, teaching staff and their families after the principal of the college ordered its closure amid apprehensions about an impending military operation against militants.
‘The vehicles were waylaid by armed militants in the Bakkakhel area and commandeered towards Marwat Canal,’ the official said.
Police said that some women and children were later freed. But, the militants carrying rockets, grenades and automatic machine guns boarded the vehicles and commandeered them to some unspecified place.
Another coach, carrying 17 people, including 10 students, a librarian and a doctor, managed to reach the Miryan police station in Bannu. They were later escorted to the Cantonment police station for their onward journey to their destinations, the police official said.
‘The Taliban are behind the kidnapping,’ Mir Sardar, Assistant Sub-Inspector of the Miryan police station, told The New York Times by phone from Bannu.
Marwat Canal leads to South Waziristan’s Spinkay, through Frontier Region Tank, linked up by a nullah frequently used by militants to bypass security checkposts.
Gul Bahadur, leader of the Ittehad-i-Shura Mujahideen, North Waziristan, has wide influence in Bakkakhel and some officials believe that the kidnapping could not have taken place without his blessing.
‘He thinks that he can hoodwink us by escorting these students and teachers to fulfil his commitment not to harm them in his area of influence and then have them kidnapped from Bakkakhel. But we all know whose people operate in Bakkakhel,’ the official said.
The number of those kidnapped varied, but one official put the figure at close to 518, including cadets and members of the teaching staff.
District Police Officer of Bannu Iqbal Marwat, however, said that 67 cadets had managed to reach the police, while over 400 were missing.
Tags: Pakistan, war on terror
