Pakistan Has Caught More Taliban Than You Think
Feb 25, 2010 Pakistan, pakistan politics
FP

Since Oct. 7, 2001, when the first U.S. B-52 bombers began bombarding Taliban installations around Kabul, the United States and its allies have been waiting for Pakistan to demonstrate its sincerity in the war being fought on Afghan soil. The arrest of nine Taliban militants in the Pakistani city of Karachi, including the Afghan Taliban’s second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, may indicate a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s relations with the NATO states fighting in Afghanistan.
Despite former President Pervez Musharraf’s repeated public commitment to the war on terror, the U.S. intelligence community has remained wary of its Pakistani interlocutors — the military and the mighty Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s main spy agency — because of their longstanding complicity with Afghanistan’s Taliban factions. Its suspicions kept falling on the ISI for allegedly protecting Afghan Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the eldest son of veteran jihadist leader Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The arrest of Baradar, known as the Taliban’s master strategist, might put an end to these rumors. This success was followed by a deluge of arrests of other Taliban and jihadi leaders, likely on evidence provided by Baradar. These include Ameer Muawiya, an associate of Osama bin Laden responsible for foreign al Qaeda militants in Pakistan’s border areas, and Akhunzada Popalzai, also known as Mohammad Younis, a former Taliban shadow governor in Afghanistan’s southern Zabul province and ex-police chief of Kabul. Earlier this week, the Pakistani police also picked up Maulvi Kabir, a former governor of Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province, from a town about 20 kilometers east of Peshawar.
Pakistan also captured a number of other significant figures in the raid that netted it Baradar. Others captured in Karachi include Hamza, a former Afghan army commander in Helmand province during Taliban rule; Abu Riyad al-Zarqawi, a liaison with Chechen and Tajik militants in Pakistan’s border area; and Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mohammad, former shadow governors for Kunduz province and Baghlan province, respectively.
The arrest of over a dozen key Taliban commanders amounts to a serious blow to the insurgency in Afghanistan. Intriguingly, while Pakistani officials claim Baradar was captured in Karachi, some sources insist the arrest took place several days earlier in Baluchistan, the Pakistani southwestern province along the border with Afghanistan. But regardless of where Baradar was picked up, the utility of the intelligence gained from his capture and the motives of Pakistan in going after the Afghan Taliban, this development is significant in many ways.
First, Baradar has become the latest in a long string of Taliban stalwarts captured by Pakistani and U.S. authorities. The ISI, possibly working in conjunction with the CIA, was responsible for the killing of key Taliban commanders Mullah Dadullah and Akhtar Mohammad Osmani in 2006. The 2007 arrest of Mullah Obaidullah, the former Taliban defense minister and Baradar’s predecessor, was also apparently the result of a joint operation — not so different from the arrest, in 2003, of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. The expanding list of Pakistani successes underscores the ever-increasing army-to-army cooperation and intelligence sharing between the two countries.
Intelligence officials in Islamabad also point to the Feb. 17 drone strike in North Waziristan as further evidence of growing intelligence cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. The attack killed Muhammad Haqqani, the 30-year-old son of Jalaluddin Haqqani and the younger brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is leading the Haqqani network in the area. U.S. officials have long accused Pakistan of protecting the Haqqanis, and this strike could be proof that the two allies are increasingly on the same page on this issue.
Perhaps the most important reason for the improved ties between these two allies is the personal rapport that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen and Centcom chief Gen. David Petraeus have cultivated with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and the head of the ISI, Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha.
Since assuming his position as Army Chief from Musharraf in November 2007, Kayani has quietly endeavored to distance himself from his predecessor, relieving Musharraf’s allies of sensitive duties and charting a new course in the Army’s relationship with the United States. He has increasingly provided U.S. military commanders with operational details and critical information concerning regional developments.
Tags: Af Pak, afghanistan, cia, Kiyani, Mullah Obaidullah, obama, Pak Army, Pakistan, taliban, war on terror
A new understanding for the U.S. and Pakistan?
Feb 11, 2010 News & Events, Pakistan
By Imtiaz Gul, FP

During a briefing at his office in the garrison town of Rawalpindi earlier this month, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani staunchly defended Pakistan’s efforts to combat the militant groups operating on its territory, while pointing toward the still-prominent perceived threat from India as a reason for not taking the operations further.
“During our counterterror campaign we have lost 2,273 army and paramilitary soldiers including three generals, five brigadiers, as many as 73 senior intelligence operatives, and also faced the blowback from Islamist militants,” Kayani told us, citing internal instability, a violent spate of suicide bombings — 87 in 2009 alone — and an adverse impact on Pakistan’s economy.
The Pakistani Army has been conducting counterinsurgency campaigns in 11 tribal areas plus Swat since 2007, including some 209 major military operations, and has committed almost 150,000 of its 550,000-troop army to this effort in the northwestern border regions, the general told us. Kayani noted that Pakistan remains concerned about India’s Pakistan-specific military capability, as six of India’s 13 strike corps are currently deployed along the border, and India’s involvement in Afghanistan is ongoing.
Kayani also pointed to the “Cold Start doctrine” propounded by archrival India and the talk of “limited war” under a “nuclear overhang,” suggested by the outgoing Indian army chief in November, saying that this policy and rhetoric do alarm Pakistan’s security apparatus. “You plan on an adversary’s capability and not intentions,” Kayani explained. While the capability takes years to build, intentions may change overnight and Pakistan simply cannot depend on other’s intentions, he reasoned.
“I explained to NATO leaders in Brussels [during a recent security conference there] that understanding Pakistan’s strategic framework would help them understand the situation in a much better way,” Kayani said. Before his late January presentation in Brussels, Kayani had made a similar forceful case before the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi. “If you care about India getting upset, care about us as well. You have to balance the concern for India with concern for our interests,” was the blunt message he described.
Kayani reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to a “peaceful, stable, and friendly Afghanistan.” As he said earlier this month, “We cannot wish for Afghanistan anything that we don’t wish for Pakistan.” In this context he brushed aside the allegations of Pakistan pursuing “a strategic depth policy” in Afghanistan. “This does not imply controlling Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is peaceful, stable, and friendly we have our strategic depth because our western border is secure… You’re not looking both ways — as simple as that.”
Kayani again insisted that Pakistan must “consolidate our gains and fully stabilize the areas secured, lest they fall back to terrorists,” in response to the oft-repeated demand from the U.S. that Pakistan move against militants based in North Waziristan. “Constraints of our capability to absorb and operate, limited cutting edge counterintelligence and counterterrorism capability, and limited budgetary space should be factored in,” he said, referring to last fall’s Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan, which had served as a of terrorism for Pakistani, Arab, and Uzbek Islamist militants. Kayani explained that the Army had managed to hamper militant logistics and restrict operating space in North Waziristan.
From that, it’s straightforward to discern that Kayani’s army would far prefer to choose the scale and timing of any military operations into North Waziristan, rather than be dictated to by the United States. The Army says that any “military adventures into the tribal regions require extreme caution and consideration for the future.” International troops will not be in Afghanistan forever, the Pakistani argument runs, so in several years Pakistan will be on its own to co-exist with the very tribes that would be hurt when or if the Pakistani Army moves against the militants nestled among them. Thus, Kayani has been explaining to the U.S. and NATO that Pakistan must balance the West’s comparatively short-term interests in containing and eliminating the insurgencies with its own long-term objectives, namely securing its western border without offending the tribes that live in that region.
And when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen said in December that he “couldn’t give the Pakistani Army anything but an ‘A’ for how they’ve conducted their battle so far,” it was after Mullen had spent several hours flying over the mountains and gorges of Pakistan’s Swat Valley with Kayani. Mullen was apparently so impressed that he asked Kayani to take the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan Gen. Stanley McChrystal on a similar tour so he could “get a sense of how and what you need to fight in such a difficult terrain,” according to the general.
McChrystal flew over from Kabul shortly thereafter for the detailed aerial view of Swat’s hilly and forested topography that had served as a natural sanctuary for the terrorists of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and left with an appreciation for Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign, according to Kayani. For Kayani, who took charge of Pakistan’s army in November 2007, this was hard-earned praise.
And recently, President Obama asked Congress for an additional $500 million to support Pakistan. If approved, the ‘Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund’ would jump to $1.2 billion in the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 2010, and the money under the fund would be used to train and equip the Pakistan military to fight militants more effectively along the Afghan border.
Several Pakistani generals, including Kayani, believe the praise by Mullen and the subsequent request by Obama for additional counterinsurgency funding for their anti-militant reflects a new understanding among the coalition of Pakistani concerns and constraints. The language and vocabulary emanating from Washington and London toward Islamabad has changed in recent months, a prerequisite for creating greater trust among the coalition partners, according to Pakistani generals. Let us see what wonders the changed vocabulary can work in the coming months.
Tags: cia, Gen Kiyani, obama, Pak Army, Pakistan, US, war, war on terror
Why Pakistan will not mount new attacks on militants
Jan 22, 2010 News & Events, Pakistan, pakistan politics

With its announcement that it will launch no new offensives against the Taliban in 2010, Pakistan’s army appears to have opened a new innings in its favourite game with the West, says the BBC’s Syed Shoaib Hasan in Islamabad.
For the United States, the statement by the Pakistan army could not have come at a worse time.
Its main intelligence agency, the CIA, is still coming to terms with the death of seven personnel in a suicide attack in Afghanistan by an al-Qaeda “double agent”.
That attack, the worst suffered by the agency in four decades, was apparently planned and carried out by Taliban militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Under pressure from the US, the Pakistan army launched an operation there in the main Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan in November 2009.
The army has since been able to secure that territory and push out the militants.
While some have been captured, most senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders have fled the region.
Intelligence officials say they have now taken refuge either in other nearby tribal regions or the neighbouring Balochistan province.
Mission impossible
Top US officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have been calling for the military to go after the militants in these regions.
All this comes at a time when Pakistan’s government is already under a great deal of domestic criticism.
This is mainly due to increased missile strikes by the US targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in the tribal areas.
These have turned a sometimes ambivalent tribal population against the Pakistan military.
Analysts say the tribesmen see the strikes, which have claimed more lives of civilians than of militants, as contiguous with the military operation.
But US officials have continued to press for more action, painting doomsday scenarios for Pakistan.
The latest such warning comes from US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, who said in India that al-Qaeda was planning to carry out attacks to provoke war with Pakistan.
But the Pakistan military appears to have its own views on the subject, and their say is likely to count the most.
Tags: Al qaida, Black Water, cia, Millitants, Pak Army, Pakistan, Raw, war on terror, Waziristan
Pakistan Female Fighter pilots break down barriers CNN report
Nov 7, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (CNN) — Six years ago an ad in the Sunday paper changed a young Pakistani woman’s life and made aviation history.
The ad read: “Pakistan Air Force recruiting females cadets.”
Back then Ambreen Gul was 20-years old and living in Karachi. Her mother wanted her to be a doctor. She remembers her reaction when she told her she wants to fly.
“She was like: ‘You’re a girl,’” says Gul. “How will you do it? How will you fly?”
The following day Gul took the first step in proving her mother wrong. She was among the first in line at the recruitment center.
For nearly six decades it was only men who had flown Pakistan’s fighter jets. Today Gul is one of seven women who are trained and ready to fly Pakistan’s F-7 supersonic fighter jets.
“This is a feeling that makes you proud and makes you humble also,” says Gul.
Humility doesn’t mean lack of confidence.
“We can do everything better than the men,” explains cadet Nida Tariq.
“We’re more hardworking, more consistent and more patient,” adds cadet Anam Faiq.
To become a fighter pilot takes three years of training at the Air Force Academy in Risalpur, Pakistan, where the halls are lined with grainy black-and-white pictures of nearly six decades of male graduates who went on to fly for the Pakistan Air Force.
The training is often intensely physical. Here, equal opportunity means equal treatment.
If they are not good enough as per their male counterparts, we don’t let them fly,” says commanding officer Tanvir Piracha.
Some of Pakistan’s female pilots wear hijabs. Others prefer to go without the Muslim headdress. Most say changing the misconception of Muslim women is just as important as serving their country.
“Islam gives equal opportunity to females. Whatever we want to do we can,” says pilot Nadia Gul.
“To tell you the truth I’ve been given equal opportunity or I suppose more than men have been given,” says Air Force cadet Sharista Beg.
Air Force officials say fighter pilots are playing a vital role in the fight against the Taliban. They’re training in counterinsurgency, collecting aerial intelligence and targeting militant strongholds in the treacherous mountains of Pakistan’s tribal region along the Afghan border. Ambreen Gul says her goal now is to fly in combat.
“I would give my life for my country,” she says.
But women rarely fly in combat anywhere in the world and it’s never been done in Pakistan. It’s another barrier Gul plans to break.
Tags: Ambreen Gul, Female Fighter pilots, Pak Army, Pakistani femail air fighter
Perspective of Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan
Nov 5, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan, pakistan politics
Within hours of U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s arrival, Pakistan faced the deadliest militant attack in two years. News media examine what this could mean for American and Taliban sentiment in the region.
Tags: Hillary Clinton, islamabad, Pak Army, Pakistan, Perspective, Peshawar, taliban, Talibna, terrorism, U.S. Secretary, USA, war on terror
‘We are prepared for a long war’
Nov 4, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan, pakistan politics
PESHAWAR: A Taliban spokesman denied Tuesday that Pakistan army has won a series of battlefield victories in its offensive in tribal South Waziristan, saying the militants are drawing government soldiers into a trap.
‘We are prepared for a long war,’ Azam Tariq told an Associated Press reporter by telephone.
‘The areas we are withdrawing from, and the ones the army is claiming to have won, are being vacated by us as part of a strategy. The strategy is to let the army get in a trap, and then fight a long war.’
Tariq also denied army claims that hundreds of militants have been killed, saying only 11 have died so far.
In mid-October, the Pakistani government launched an offensive in the South Waziristan tribal region, viewed as the main stronghold in the country of both the Taliban and al-Qaida.
The military says it has pressed deep into Taliban territory and captured some Taliban strongholds. The offensive has drawn retaliatory militant attacks across Pakistan.
A few hours after Tariq’s claim, the army announced that 21 militants had been killed in the past 24 hours in South Waziristan and that government forces were continuing to press into Taliban territory. It said in a statement that one government soldier had died in the past day.
Much of the fighting was in Sararogha, a Taliban base where militant leaders have long operated openly, occasionally even using it for news conferences. The army said it killed 16 fighters there as it tried to clear the town of militants.
What is actually happening, though, is impossible to confirm.
Pakistan has effectively sealed off the tribal areas, semiautonomous regions where the central government in Islamabad has long had only minimal authority. —AP
Tags: Al qaida, Azam Tariq, Pak Army, Pakistan, Sararogha, South Waziristan, Swat, taliban, war on terror, Waziristan
The battle for Waziristan: Operation Rah-i-Nijaat
Oct 18, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan
By Sayed Bokhari
Sunday, 18 Oct, 2009

Though military operations are launched unannounced to catch the enemy off guard, the case of Operation Rah-i-Nijaat has been altogether different.
While at the time of writing troop movement and reports emanating from Peshawar indicated that the operation had begun in South Waziristan, since June there have been regular indications that the army was ready to start hostilities against the Taliban in the area.
This strategy may have been initiated to give ample time to the civilian population of Waziristan to leave for safer places and convert the area into a battlefield where the security forces could unleash their arsenal without causing too much collateral damage.
In June NWFP Governor Owais Ghani announced that the government had finally decided to go all out against the (now dead) chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, and his cronies and that the army and other law-enforcement agencies were being given a free hand to take them on.
The decision was welcomed as the TTP had inflicted severe sufferings on innocent civilians, slaughtered men in uniform, assassinated religious scholars and bombed educational institutions and government infrastructure.
Figures vary, but it is estimated that Waziristan is home to more than 5,000 hardened militants besides some 2,000 Uzbek fighters. The total strength of the enemy in the area is said to be 10,000. The reported death of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) leader Tahir Yuldashev in a drone attack in South Waziristan in August was a big blow to the violent foreign militant group that was waging a fierce campaign against Pakistan and its state agencies. The death of Yuldashev has deprived the IMU of a leader credited with masterminding deadly attacks on military convoys and camps.
On the face of it at least, the prevailing conditions in Waziristan are favourable for Operation Rah-i-Nijaat. It is widely believed that the command structure of the TTP is in disarray. Its dreaded chief Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a US missile strike in August. The success of Operation Rah-i-Raast in Swat has also bolstered the morale of troops and inspired confidence among the people.
Isolating Baitullah’s group from other militant organisations active in the area was an important strategic consideration and perhaps the government has managed to do that vis-à -vis the Maulvi Nazir group in the Wana area in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. Past events reveal that some militants of the Nazir group were killed by pro-Baitullah fighters inside Mehsud territory, resulting in a bitter feud between the two groups. Hence winning over the Nazir group would not have been too difficult.
Another commander, Misbahuddin, leads the anti-Baitullah group. This group has assisted the law-enforcement agencies in pointing out militants belonging to the Baitullah group even in Islamabad and Karachi. All this is of course countered by what the military will be up against. There are two major forces which are likely to support the Baitullah group against the army — the Haqqani network, which is mostly active in Afghanistan fighting Nato forces, and the IMU.
To take care of this contingency, additional troops are said to have been deployed to occupy the strategic heights along the Mehsud territory’s border with North Waziristan besides the sealing of four access points in the battle zone from Razmak-Makeen, Wana-Ludda, Jandola-Sararogha and Kanigoram-Jandola. The Shawal mountains would thus be the only escape route available to the militants, but would effectively prove a dangerous one for them because of air and ground firepower.
In view of the operation that appears to have begun, the army placed two divisions consisting of 27,000 soldiers to take on an estimated 10,000 hard-core Taliban militants. The army has spent weeks cutting off militants’ escape routes and softening up targets in the region, using limited intelligence-led ground and air strikes.
It is believed that over the past three months the army has been drawing up plans, holding in-depth deliberations and carrying out critical analyses of past actions in the area. One issue that the army would have deliberated on is that of the peace accords drawn up in the past that only helped the militants gain respite from hostilities and a chance to reorganise. Another measure that has been taken to paralyse the militants in the area is the placement of an economic blockade since last June. This measure is said to have restricted supplies to the Taliban. It is hoped that it would further squeeze the fighting ability of the militants.
One of the fallouts of military operations is the plight of the internally displaced. In Waziristan it is estimated that tens of thousands of persons will be displaced due to the conflict. The IDPs would have to be given shelter and food in safer areas in Tank, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The experience of handling a large number of internal refugees from Malakand division during Rah-i-Raast should come in handy in the care of those displaced by the Waziristan operation.
Weather conditions could play a part in hampering free movement. In the Mehsud area snowfall commences at the end of November. Logistic support to troops would then be restricted. Such weather conditions could be advantageous to the militants, who have intimate knowledge of the terrain and unfrequented routes.
The battle for Waziristan has been characterised as the ‘mother of all battles’. The battle will take place over a formidable terrain covering 2,420 square kilometres. It will take a huge human toll. With the start of the operation the Taliban will try to ignite fires elsewhere in Pakistan as they already appear to be doing. More suicide attacks can be expected in large cities like Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. The epicentre of the Taliban and the Uzbek militants lies in South Waziristan. Thus for these militants it is a battle for existence.
Tags: Operation Rah-i-Nijaat, Pak Army, Rah-i-Nijaat, taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Waziristan
Work on New GHQ Complex in capital may start soon
Oct 12, 2009 News & Events, Pakistan
The News ISLAMABAD: The security of the GHQ situated in the thickly-populated area of Rawalpindi stood exposed yet another time in the wake of the Saturday’s terrorist attack on it. Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani halted the construction of the new GHQ in the federal capital last year when the federal government declined to provide assistance for the building of the complex in Islamabad under the pretext of economic meltdown. The armed forces and the federal government would review the decision to shelve the GHQ construction next month so that its construction might be restarted without any further delay. The Army has decided not to burden the national exchequer for the construction since it intends to dispose of its precious lands and some other assets. The income that would be generated through a transparent system would be spent on the construction of the GHQ in Islamabad. In addition, the Army will contribute 25 per cent of the expenditures to the federal government for development purposes. Well-placed defence sources revealed to The News that the GHQ’s compound is part of the capital’s master plan and about two thousand acres of land was earmarked for the purpose in Sectors E-10 and E-11. Former President General Pervez Musharraf laid the foundation stone of the GHQ in 2004 but no work could be started till 2006 but later it was shelved. The existing GHQ does not fulfill the requirements of base needed for war planning and its execution. The planned GHQ in Islamabad would fulfill the criteria’s of the new and secure GHQ, the sources said.
Tags: GHQ, Islamabad GHQ, New GHQ, Pak Army
GHQ Attack: New tactic employed by terrorists
Oct 11, 2009 Uncategorized
The attacks on the Army GHQ, and the WFP office, reveals a new tactic being employed by terrorist groups; dressing up like the security forces they intend to target. In both instances, terrorists have managed to guise themselves in camouflaged attire, often escaping the critical eye of even the most astute observer. According to the Defence Minister, wearing military uniform by terrorists is the new modus operandi of attacks on govt. installations. But is it really that simple for militants to get their hands on military uniforms?
DawnNews’ Danial Khan takes a look at how the Pakistan army uniform lands up at the flea market.
Tags: GHQ Attack, islamabad, Lahore Lunda bazar, Pak Army, Rawalpinid, Talibans, Tehr, Tehrik-i-Taliban, terrorists








