Pakistan’s non-reaction to Wikileaks
Aug 17, 2010 Pakistan
On the morning of July 26 I woke up at home in Karachi, nine hours ahead of eastern time, to an e-mail from an American friend who writes for The Atlantic’s website. “How is WikiLeaks playing in Pakistan?” he wanted to know. The story had broken overnight, and I had no idea what he was talking about. In turn I picked up Dawn, The News, and The Express Tribune, the three Pakistani newspapers that are delivered to my house every day. Not one of them had anything to say on the issue.
It was another matter entirely when I logged onto my computer and the New York Times website. For the next several hours I was transfixed, trying to digest both the firestorm in the international media and the pin-drop silence at home.
The most likely explanation of this is that the story broke too late to make it into Pakistani newspapers on Monday morning. The conspiracy-minded might argue it could have been suppressed, perhaps even in advance, by the Pakistani state, or that domestic newspapers would not want to jump into dangerous territory without taking the time to examine the matter closely. Either way, the silence continued almost unbroken throughout the day.
By early afternoon the websites of dailies Dawn and The Express Tribune carried only one story each; both were wire reports. Later in the day they had each added one more. The News, which vies with Dawn for the top circulation spot among English-language newspapers, remained silent on the issue. When I turned on the television, news channels were focusing on domestic stories. Even the small group of Pakistani journalists and analysts who are usually quick to Twitter about politics and current affairs didn’t seem to be particularly interested. While the Western media tied itself into knots over the implications for the war in Afghanistan and for how information gets disseminated today, Pakistan maintained a stony silence.
On Tuesday the indifference hadn’t fully worn away. Only two of five English-language dailies, which are generally considered less right-wing than Urdu newpapers, carried editorials on the issue, and many newspaper reports were still based on wire stories rather than their own reporting or analysis. It was earlier today, finally, that the issue began to get some fraction of the coverage it has been getting in the West.
Tuesday’s front pages show one reason why. Alongside the WikiLeaks story, and sometimes as the main lead, appeared the deadly suicide bombing outside the home of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s Information Minster, an outspoken critic of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and a member of the secular ANP party that governs the province. Tragically, it targeted a gathering held to mourn the loss of his young son, who was killed at gunpoint just two days earlier in an incident the TTP claimed responsibility for. Another major story crammed onto the front page was about a 10-rupee-per-kilogram rise in the price of government-subsidized sugar, an increase that sounds minimal but, following massive earlier price hikes resulting in part from government inability to manage food supplies, has real and troubling implications for a population that can now barely afford anything beyond wheat and vegetables. Amidst the Western media’s focus on Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, the war’s political implications for Barack Obama and how Afghanistan is carpeted with Taliban IEDs, Pakistan simply has too much at home to worry about. Perceptions of the country in the West take a back seat when severe electricity shortages, spiraling food prices and devastating terrorist attacks confront us every day.
There is also, as Mosharraf Zaidi pointed out in The News in the rare (if not only) column on the issue on Tuesday, the country’s lack of surprise any time the Pakistani intelligence service the ISI and the Taliban are mentioned in the same sentence. As a result of lingering suspicion of the U.S., the narrative here is not so much denying ISI involvement as it is resentful of American focus on that aspect of the leaks amidst all the material available, and of what could be considered unreliable evidence about the spy agency’s actions. The first news reports to acknowledge the issue jumped straight to this secondary point instead of telling the story of the leaks itself: “US condemns leak alleging Pakistan spy-insurgent links” and “ISI denounces leaked intel documents” were the headlines of the stories on news websites on Monday. Editorials on Tuesday and Wednesday have focused heavily on the non-Pakistan aspects of the leaks, such as civilian casualties and the Taliban’s stranglehold on Afghanistan, and expressed doubts about reports on ISI collusion. And when the New York Times led with the Pakistan angle while the Guardian focused on civilian deaths and more strongly emphasized the questionable nature of material about the ISI, these choices fed into the perception that U.S. media reports about the story were simply hype, if not biased.
My exchange with a fellow Pakistani journalist on Monday was telling. In a series of e-mails that afternoon, we wondered what the motive was behind the leaks and their timing — was this really the work of a lone conscientious objector, or even a group of them, who were somehow able to release 90,000 documents that included details on classified military action and the struggling war strategy of NATO and the U.S.? Or was it a larger political move to hurt Obama before mid-term elections in November? Was it done deliberately by the White House, which subsequently pointed out that the reports covered the time period before Obama took office and therefore vindicated his new strategy? Was this the Pentagon trying to put pressure on the ISI, or a U.S. government attempt to curb Pakistan’s role in Afghan Taliban reconciliation, and hence its growing influence over Karzai?
This is one stereotype about Pakistanis that is true. We have grown up as a security state run by the military and intelligence agencies, with a co-dependent yet troubled relationship with the U.S., and our instinct is to question the obvious version of any story. One could argue, in that vein, that some media outlets here initially suppressed this one under either implicit or explicit state pressure. But amidst daily tragedy, and in an atmosphere of enduring mistrust of the U.S., the story never really had a chance.
Madiha Sattar is a senior assistant editor at the Karachi-based monthly The Herald.
Tags: cia, Pakistan, US, war on terror, Wikileaks
Pakistan ranked 10th in ForeignPolicy: Images from the world’s most failed states.
Aug 7, 2010 Pakistan
Pakistan has more than once been described as the world’s most dangerous country. Its wild northern reaches remain host to various branches of the Pakistani Taliban and likely to al Qaeda (Osama bin Laden is thought to be among them), while other militant groups make gains closer to urban areas. The bomb that went off here left six dead in Quetta, in the country’s southwest. More than 3 million Pakistani civilians were displaced by “counterinsurgency” operations in 2009 — the largest single movement of people since the Rwandan genocide. Meanwhile, President Asif Ali Zardari’s democratically elected government looks hapless — unable to gain any measure of civilian control over a nuclear-armed military obsessed with planning for a war with India, or an intelligence service that stands accused of abetting the Afghan Taliban.
Tags: AFpak, Failed States, Pakistan, Sucide attacks, war on terror
Drone Attack on Schools
Jul 4, 2010 Pakistan, pakistan politics
Tags: afghanistan, cia, Drone Attack, Drones, ISI, Pakistan, USA, war on terror
Three Is the Loneliest Number
Jun 3, 2010 Uncategorized
FP
BY BRUCE RIEDEL | JUNE 2, 2010
What does the killing of al Qaeda’s No. 3, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, mean for Osama bin Laden?
The death of Mustafa Ahmed Mohammad Uthman Abu al-Yazid, also known as Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, al Qaeda’s operational commander in Afghanistan, in a drone attack in Pakistan last month is a significant but not fatal setback for the group — and another sign that the Obama administration’s stepped-up pressure is having a real impact and disrupting the group’s activities. Al Qaeda announced his death in a message released on May 31 — and though the terrorist group is hurting, it is likely far from being on the ropes.
A bit of background: Yazid was an Egyptian close to Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s “No. 2.” He was involved, like Zawahiri, in the plot to assassinate Anwar Sadat in 1981 and, following their release from prison in the mid-1980s, the two created the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. That group merged with al Qaeda in 1998, and since then Yazid has worked as a fundraiser and has appeared often as a spokesman and commentator. He was actively involved in planning the September 11, 2001, attacks.
According to some reports, he was also al Qaeda’s third-highest ranking officer. If so, then he is (by my count) the seventh individual identified by U.S. intelligence as al Qaeda’s “No. 3″ since 2001 who has been killed or captured. Being No. 3 is clearly a dangerous job. For its part, al Qaeda itself has never identified anyone as the third man in its chain of command, and most likely there is more than one individual, at any one time, who reports to Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden directly.
Whether or not he was No. 3, Yazid was a key al Qaeda operative. Yazid was likely involved in al Qaeda’s plot last year to attack the New York City metro system with three suicide bombers at rush hour on the Monday after the 9/11 anniversary. Two Afghan-Americans have pleaded guilty to that plot and have said they were being directed by al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.
And, in his role as chief of operations in Afghanistan, Yazid would have been directly involved in the planning of the Dec. 30 suicide-bomber attack on the CIA’s forward operating base in Khost, which killed six officers and a senior Jordanian intelligence officer. In terms of loss of life, it was the second-worst day in CIA history, but as far as operational readiness was affected, it clearly did not interrupt drone strikes significantly.
But drones, like the one that killed Yazid, are only one part of Barack Obama’s strategy to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al Qaeda — and the U.S. president is far from achieving that goal. At best, the new pressure is impacting the terrorists’ operational tempo, but has not stopped them from planning and staging attacks on U.S. targets.
One example is Zawahiri himself. Since December, he has appeared only once in al Qaeda’s propaganda output, a brief message last month eulogizing the death of two senior al Qaeda commanders in Iraq. Before this year, Zawahiri was a frequent commentator on al Qaeda audio and video messages, often appearing every other week. His absence is probably related to the Khost attack: He was the bait that al Qaeda dangled before the CIA operatives — a prize so tempting that routine procedures were overlooked, allowing a suicide bomber fatal access to the base. Zawahiri’s absence from the airwaves has been noted in the jihadi underworld, but his ability to direct attacks on U.S. and Western targets has likely been diminished only slightly.
As for bin Laden, the most wanted man in history and the target of the largest manhunt ever conducted, CIA drones have not yet been able to get close to him, either. The last time U.S. intelligence had eyes on al Qaeda’s No. 1 was in 2001. For almost nine years since then, he has been off the radar — avoiding telephones, using trusted couriers to send messages, and receiving protection from powerful interests. But he has appeared in four audio messages so far this year, so reports of his demise have been greatly exaggerated.
Thus, though Yazid’s death is a significant scalp, both bin Laden and Zawahiri are still very much active. The drones will not defeat al Qaeda by themselves. Nor are they intended to; Obama’s strategy uses them as one tool in a broader diplomatic and military offensive. But this campaign, which is showing signs of progress, has a long way to go yet.
Tags: afghanistan, al Qaeda's, AlQaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden, cia, FBI, Mustafa Ahmed Mohammad Uthman Abu al-Yazid, Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, USA, war, war on terror
Hamid Mir Talking About His Exclusive Tape With Tailban
May 27, 2010 Uncategorized
Kehney Mei Kya Harj Hai 25th May 2010.Hamid Mir Anchor Geo News, Mazhar Abbas Anchor ARY News and Masood Sharif Khattak in fresh episode of Kehnay Mein Kia Harj Hai and discusses current issues with Muhammad Malik.
Tags: Hamid Mir, Hamid Mir Tape with Taliban, Hamid Mir with Taliban, taliban, war on terror
On Being Pakistani
May 17, 2010 Pakistan, war on terror
SLAMABAD (May 16) — Pakistanis are becoming the world’s pariahs. Since being implicated in a steady stream of violent attacks — from the London Tube bombings in 2005 to this month’s failed attempt to bomb Times Square — it seems almost inevitable now that when the next act of terrorism happens, a Pakistani will be involved.
As a Canadian of Pakistani descent, I’ve watched this pattern emerge with a rising sense of trepidation. Thirty-five years ago, when my parents decided to move to Canada, things were much different. Pakistanis were different. They were much in demand — an intelligent, hard-working people who integrated and contributed positively to society, wherever they went.
What a terrible journey we’ve made since then.
Today, Pakistanis are objects of fear and suspicion. Wherever we go we must contend with the “terrorist” label and endure the scrutiny that accompanies it. Like many of my compatriots, I’ve been “interviewed” by the Joint Terrorism Task Force at the U.S. border, questioned at Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi airport and scrutinized with extra efficiency by a German border control officer. Every time it happens, a piece of advice a Sufi in Saudi Arabia once gave me cycles through my mind: “When an obstacle is placed in front of you,” he said, “be like water — flow around it.”
Pakistanis are being asked to flow a lot these days, and it will not get better any time soon. Many people in the world must be asking why it is that so many acts of terrorism in the West seem to lead back to Pakistan. Is there something in the Pakistani psyche that makes them susceptible to violence?
What those people might be surprised to hear is that Pakistanis are asking the same questions.
At the forefront is something quite basic: How did this happen? How, in 30 years — a mere generation — have Pakistanis gone from being desirable to becoming undesirables?
The standard narrative goes something like this: During the 1980s, the U.S. promoted violent jihad in Pakistan to create a proxy army to fight against the godless Soviets in Afghanistan. The Americans funded the growth of jihad ideology, encouraged the construction of madrasas — religious seminaries that have now become militant birthing grounds — and are now fighting the jihadists they helped to create, including Osama bin Laden.
But there is another side to the story. After Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military establishment decided to continue using the jihadists as proxies, both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. That cold-hearted act of realpolitik was inspired by a neo-Cold War mentality in which India was — and still is — viewed as an existential threat to Pakistan.
Most Pakistanis feel that America has brought war on them, a war no one here wanted and which is ultimately killing Pakistanis. But for me, and for a silent minority of Pakistanis as well, there is an alarming lack of recognition of the role played by Pakistan’s own armed forces and intelligence agencies in sending Pakistan down the road to jihad.
There are two reasons for this. First, for decades, Pakistan’s generals have diligently maintained the illusion that the army is the only reason Pakistan has not collapsed. Pakistanis are spoon-fed this false perception from childhood, indoctrinated into believing that the army is the Great Savior, the Protector, the Guardian.
Second, opposing the army can have dire consequences. The execution of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979 is one salient example. The mounting evidence of an army role in the December 2008 assassination of his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, is another.
Just a few days ago my uncle expressed his concern in connection with the work I was doing tracing Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad’s militant connections back to groups linked to Pakistan’s dreaded spy service, the ISI. “You don’t understand these people,” he warned me. “They can make you disappear and you will never be found again. No one can stand up to them.”
But somebody must stand up to them. Pakistan’s image in the world, not to mention its future, depends on it. Is it an accident that Faisal Shahzad was the son of a senior Pakistani military officer? I don’t think so. Military culture in this country is virulently anti-American. Couple it with the rampant spread of jihad ideology — also the product of the army’s failed policies — and you end up with a deadly mix.
The failed attack on Times Square is only the tip of the iceberg. The fear among many Pakistanis is that some similar attempt is likely to succeed. With each attack, fear and suspicion of any Pakistani is bound to rise. And the irony is that as Pakistan spirals into chaos, young people here are increasingly looking to get out.
Two of my cousins are waiting for their immigration papers to be approved in Canada. They are educated, moderate Pakistani Muslims, much like Shahzad appeared to be until recently. They worry now that the environment of fear will hamper their efforts for a better life abroad. My brother, a professor of biochemistry at Trinity College in Dublin, is planning a sabbatical to Harvard, but worries about the treatment he’ll receive there.
Bearded Pakistanis have been under the microscope for years. Now, clean-shaven, Ray-Ban-wearing Pakistanis may be in for the same treatment. My advice to them is to listen to the Sufis. Self-respect lies within the self; no one can take it away from you. Be like water.
Adnan S. Khan covers Pakistan for AOL News.
Tags: ISI, Pakistan, Pakistanis, taliban, terrorists, war on terror
Can Obama make “peace” in the Middle East
May 11, 2010 Videos
Tags: cia, Middle East, NATO, obama, war on terror
Ex-ISI official Khalid Khwaja found dead in Fata
May 1, 2010 Pakistan, pakistan politics
Dawn
PESHAWAR: Militants in North Waziristan killed on Friday Khalid Khwaja, a former officer of the Inter-Services Intelligence, who was kidnapped on March 26 along with another ISI officer and Taliban sympathiser Col (retd) Amir Sultan Tarar and British journalist Asad Qureshi. Khalid Khwaja was shot in the head and chest. A little known Asian Tigers group had claimed responsibility for the kidnapping.
Khwaja’s body was found near a stream in Karam Kot, about 7 kilometres south of Mirali.
Local people said they had seen the body but did not pick it up for fear of militants’ attack. A senior official said a jirga of local notables and clerics deputed by the local administration had retrieved the body.
Officials said the body would be taken to Islamabad and handed over to family. A note found with the body said that Khwaja was working for the Americans and anybody working for them would meet the same fate.
An email sent to media by a spokesman for the Asian Tigers said that Khwaja was executed because the government had not met its demands, including release of senior Afghan Taliban leaders Mullah Baradar and Mansoor Dadullah.
Mr Javed Ibrahim Paracha, who played host to Khwaja and his companions when they had stopped over in Kohat on way to North Waziristan, said the Asian Tigers was an offshoot of the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi comprising mostly Punjabi Taliban.
Mr Paracha said that Khwaja had told him they were going to North Waziristan to work on a documentary with a journalist from a British television channel to highlight collateral damage caused by drone attacks.
But Khwaja’s son, Osama Khalid, told a private television channel his father had gone on a peace mission.
He said that a Punjabi militant named Osman had organised the group’s visit to North Waziristan.
According to a journalist who had spoken to Khwaja before his departure for the restive region he had told him that he wanted to persuade the Taliban to stop suicide bombings and attacks inside Pakistan and instead focus their attention on combating the United States and Nato forces in Afghanistan.
Khwaja served in the Inter-Services Intelligence for about a year and was dismissed from Air Force when he was a squadron leader during the days of Gen Ziaul Haq.
He rose to prominence during the Lal Masjid siege in 2007 when he took up the cause of missing people.
The kidnappers believed that he had duped Maulana Abdul Aziz, the radical head of Lal Masjid, into leaving the mosque wearing a burqa and then tipping off security personnel who arrested him. Khwaja’s family strongly denies the allegation and says that the family of Maulana Abdul Aziz stayed with them for over a month after the siege.
But according to some analysts, the main reason for his murder might have been his offer to arrange talks with security agencies in return for militants’ commitment to stop attacks inside Pakistan and focus instead on Afghanistan.
“This might have raised their (militants’) suspicion,” said one analyst. Mr Paracha said that the vehicle of Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Wali-ur Rehman had come under a drone attack soon after he had met Khwaja and his companions. Because of the attack, he said, Waliur Rehman also wanted to get hold of him.
The militant group has not said anything about Col (retd) Amir Tarar and journalist Asad Qureshi. It is reported to have demanded a $10 million ransom for the journalist, but indi- cated to some negotiators they may consider releasing Tarar.
But a sinister line at the end of the email sent to reporters said ‘what next?’ which, according to the analysts, meant that there may be another killing.
Tags: colonel imam, ISI, khalid khwaja, North Waziristan, taliban, war on terror
Al-Qa’ida struggling to find recruits in Iraq: US general
Apr 29, 2010 war on terror
AFP
April 28, 2010
AL-QA’IDA in Iraq is struggling to recruit volunteers for suicide bombings and other attacks, the US army says, hours after the jihadist network confirmed the deaths of its top commanders.
Brigadier General Ralph Baker, a senior officer in Baghdad, said no one could deny that the killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, who had direct links with Osama bin Laden, was a “decapitation” for its leadership.
The SITE Intelligence Group reported that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the al-Qa’ida front in the country, had in a statement posted on jihadist Internet forums announced for the first time the deaths of the two men.
But the insurgents also vowed in the message that other insurgents would take their place, under plans put in place ahead of the Iraqi-US military strike that killed them in a house north of Baghdad on April 18.
General Baker cautioned that the killing of AQI’s previous military leader, the much better known Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who died in a US airstrike in 2006, had shown the insurgents were capable of rebuilding.
But he said AQI was weaker now than then, and it would be harder for it to regenerate after hundreds of arrests in recent months.
“When Zarqawi was killed, someone stepped up and took his place,” General Baker said in Baghdad.
“This time we believe there are less charismatic and combat-proven leaders remaining in Al-Qa’ida that can step up and resume that leadership role as effectively as has been accomplished in the past.”
Since January, Iraqi intelligence and security services, with US support, have captured or arrested 404 Al-Qa’ida members, according to General Baker.
“Dozens of those AQI members have been mid- to upper-level leadership,” he said. “But it’s just not the leadership that Al-Qa’ida will have trouble finding replacements for.”
He said the US knew “they are having great difficulties recruiting suicide bombers” because of better security on Iraq’s border with Syria.
Although Iraq’s government, US forces and Washington trumpeted the success of the joint operation that killed Baghdadi and Masri, a series of car bomb attacks in Baghdad on Friday killed 54 people and wounded 201.
General Baker conceded that AQI was responsible, but argued that violence was falling overall, with security breaches down 40 per cent since American combat troops left Iraq’s cities, towns and villages last June.
“We do believe those (car bombs) are attributed to Al-Qa’ida,” he said. “It is very difficult to stop every attack in this city of seven million citizens.”
In the Internet statement monitored by SITE, the ISI sharia (Islamic law) minister, Abu al-Walid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mashadani, said Baghdadi and Masri were attending a meeting when “enemy forces” engaged them and launched an airstrike.
The joint operation that targeted the main Al-Qa’ida leaders in Iraq took place 10km from Tikrit, the home city of executed dictator Saddam Hussein.
Mr Mashadani praised Baghdadi and Masri and announced that other Islamist groups in Iraq had joined the ISI.
“Discussions had already begun with them before and after the initiative of Sheikh Abu Omar (al-Baghdadi),” he said.
“If Allah fated that the two sheikhs be killed at this particular time, know that they left a unique generation behind, one that was raised before their eyes.”
Baghdadi had been reported killed or captured at least three times before, and on those occasions Al-Qa’ida issued denials, insisting he was still alive and free, making Saturday’s confirmation all the more significant.
A close aide of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki told state television the discovery of Baghdadi and Masri’s hideout was a greater military achievement than the capture of Saddam by American forces in December 2003.
Yassin Majeed said an intelligence cell created by Mr Maliki which last month caught Munaf Abdul Rahim al-Rawi, AQI’s so-called “governor of Baghdad,” led to the detention of a “postman” who carried messages to Baghdadi. This eventually culminated in the operation that killed the top two AQI leaders.
“The next days will witness a new strike against al-Qa’ida,” Majeed added.
Tags: afghanistan, Al qaida, Baghdad, Iraq, US, war on terror
